12 January 2026

• The Union Government is considering legally mandating smartphone security requirements under the Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR), 2023.
• The draft proposes vulnerability analysis, including possible access to smartphone source code by government-designated labs.
• Global smartphone manufacturers such as Apple and Samsung have raised objections citing IP and privacy concerns.
• The move is linked to rising cyber fraud, malware threats, and data breaches in India’s large smartphone ecosystem (~750 million users).
• Consultations are ongoing between MeitY, IT Ministry, and industry bodies.

Key Points

• Draft framework: ITSAR, 2023  Total proposed standards: 83  
• Major provisions:
  • Source code review for vulnerability analysis
  • Testing at government-designated Indian labs
  • Automatic & periodic malware scanning on devices
  • One-year storage of device activity logs  
  • Prior intimation to National Centre for Communication Security before:
    • Major OS updates
    • Security patches
  •  Authority to test updates before release  
  • Mandatory:
    • Uninstallation of pre-loaded apps  
    • Blocking background camera/mic access
• Industry body MAIT opposes the proposal:
  • No global precedent
  • Battery drain & storage constraints
  • Delay in emergency security updates

Static Linkages

• Right to Privacy as a Fundamental Right (Puttaswamy Judgment, 2017)
• Doctrine of Proportionality in state action  
• Cyber Security Framework of India:
  • IT Act, 2000  
  • CERT-In
  • National Cyber Security Policy, 2013
• Data minimisation & purpose limitation principles (B.N. Srikrishna Committee)
• Trusted Telecom & Supply Chain Security approach

Critical Analysis

• Positives
  • Strengthens national cyber security
  • Early detection of malware & zero-day vulnerabilities
  • Limits misuse of device sensors (camera/mic)
  • Enhances state oversight of digital infrastructure
• Concerns
  • Source code access risks:
  • Intellectual Property leakage  Trade secret exposure
  • Mandatory update approvals:
  • Delay in critical security patches
• Continuous malware scanning:
  • Battery & performance impact  
• Possible surveillance overreach
• May affect Ease of Doing Business and FDI

Way Forward

• Prefer black-box testing over source code access  
• Adopt risk-based and proportional security audits  
• Align standards with global norms (ISO/IEC, ETSI)  
• Clear legal safeguards for:
  • Data access  Retention
  • Independent oversight
• Integrate reforms with Digital Personal Data Protection Act
• Institutionalised industry–government consultation mechanism

FASTER IS NOT FAIRER IN POCSO CASE

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

• In 2025, Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) disposed 109% of POCSO cases:
  • 87,754 cases disposed vs 80,320 cases registered in the same year.
  • FTSCs were launched in 2019 following directions of the Supreme Court of India, funded through the Nirbhaya Fund.
  • Despite higher disposals, conviction rates have declined, raising concerns about quality of justice under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.

Key Points

• FTSC infrastructure
  • 773 FTSCs operational; ~400 dedicated to POCSO cases.
  • ₹1,952 crore allocated from Nirbhaya Fund.  By September 2025, FTSCs disposed 3,50,685 cases.  
• Speed vs outcomes
  • FTSCs dispose ~9.5 cases/month, compared to ~3.3 cases/month in regular courts.
  • Conviction rate declined from ~35% (2019) to ~29% (2023) nationally.
  • FTSCs record ~19% convictions, with several States seeing acquittals exceeding convictions.
• Process deficits
  • Hasty investigations, incomplete charge sheets, delayed forensic reports (notably in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra).
  • Support persons under Section 39, POCSO—mandated by SC (2021) and detailed by National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (2024)— remain unempanelled in many States.
• Para-Legal Volunteers (PLVs)
  • SC (Dec 2025) directed PLVs at every police station for POCSO cases.
  • Severe gaps persist (e.g., Andhra Pradesh: 42/919 stations; Tamil Nadu: 0/1,577).
• Victim support & compensation
  • Interim compensation is legally permissible at any stage, yet often delayed until final verdicts.
  • Payments frequently arrive years later, diluting rehabilitative impact.
• Judicial inconsistencies
  • Some courts have leniently treated cases citing post-majority marriage, undermining Section 6 deterrence.
• Socio-economic costs
  • Marginalised families incur travel, legal, and livelihood losses, often exceeding State relief.

Static Linkages

• Child rights as part of Right to Life with Dignity (Article 21)
• Special courts as an instrument of judicial reform  
• Victim compensation as part of restorative justice
• Access to justice and legal aid under constitutional governance

Critical Analysis

• Positive Outcomes
  • Reduced pendency of POCSO cases.
  • Dedicated courts improved prioritisation of child sexual offences.
• Key Concerns
  • Faster disposal not matched by investigation quality.
  • Declining conviction rates indicate procedural dilution.
  • Delays in forensic reports weaken prosecution.
  • Absence of support persons leads to hostile witnesses.
  • Lack of PLVs affects FIR registration and early-stage protection.
  • Interim compensation rarely granted during trial.  
  • Judicial leniency (e.g., marriage-based reasoning) undermines deterrence.

Way Forward

• Shift focus from disposal targets to conviction quality.
• Mandatory timelines for forensic laboratories.
• Universal empanelment of support persons with RTI- based monitoring.
• Full implementation of PLVs at police station level.
• Early interim compensation linked to education and healthcare.
• Judicial training on child psychology and POCSO intent.  
• Replication of best practices from better-performing States.

THE QUAD’S YEAR OF INTERREGNUM 

• 2025 witnessed heightened geopolitical churn following the return of Donald Trump as President of the United States.
• The Indo-Pacific emerged as the most contested strategic theatre amid intensifying U.S.–China competition.
• The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)— comprising India, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. —continued to function despite the absence of a leader-level summit in 2025.
• The Quad Foreign Ministers’ meetings hosted by Marco Rubio in January and July 2025 reaffirmed U.S. commitment.
• India could not host the scheduled Quad Leaders’ Summit in 2025, making the year an interregnum phase rather than a decline.

Key Points

• Quad revived in 2017, with strong backing from the Trump administration, after losing momentum post-2007.
• Core objective: Rules-based order and a Free, Open, Inclusive Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
• Six leader-level summits held between 2021– 2024; last in Wilmington, Delaware (2024) under President Biden.
• Key initiatives operational in 2025:
  • Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission (June 2025): Coast Guard cooperation.
  • Ports of the Future Partnership (Mumbai, October 2025): Sustainable and resilient port infrastructure.
  • Malabar Exercise 2025 held in Guam (India, U.S., Japan, Australia).
• No permanent secretariat; functions through consensus and political will.
• U.S. diplomatic efforts underway to convene a leader-level summit in early 2026.

Static Linkages

• Indo-Pacific as a strategic construct highlighted in India’s Maritime Security Strategy (2015).
• UNCLOS (1982) as the legal basis for freedom of navigation and overflight.
• Disaster response cooperation roots trace back to 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.
• Alignment with India’s SAGAR doctrine and Act East Policy.
• Maritime security and port-led development emphasized in Sagarmala Programme.

Critical Analysis

• Pros
  • Enhances maritime domain awareness and interoperability.
  • Flexible, non-treaty framework suits India’s strategic autonomy.
  • Focus on global public goods: HADR, infrastructure, climate resilience.
• Concerns
  • Absence of institutional structure affects continuity.
  • Perception of being China-centric may limit ASEAN comfort.
  • Leadership transitions disrupt momentum.  
  • Overdependence on U.S. political will.
• Stakeholder Perspectives
  • India: Balancing deterrence with inclusivity.   
  • ASEAN: Prefers Quad complementarity with ASEAN centrality.
  • China: Views Quad as containment architecture.
  • U.S.: Tool for burden-sharing in Indo-Pacific.

Way Forward

• Convene Quad Leaders’ Summit at the earliest (early 2026).
• Institutionalise working groups without formal alliance structure.
• Deepen cooperation with ASEAN, IORA, and Pacific Island states.
• Expand focus on technology, supply chains, and climate finance.
• Strengthen people-centric initiatives to reinforce legitimacy.

• 2025: Administration of Donald Trump announced withdrawal from:
  • UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
  • ~65 international organisations/platforms  
  • Decision taken via Presidential Memorandum
• Reversal of multilateral commitments restored under Joe Biden
• Earlier exit from Paris Agreement during first Trump term
• 2025: U.S. disengagement from major programmes of World Health Organization

Key Points

• Withdrawals focus on UN-linked bodies dealing with:
  • Climate change & renewable energy  
  • Gender equality & minority rights
  • Labour standards & rule of law
• U.S. is among the largest contributors to:
  • WHO assessed and voluntary funding  
  • Global climate finance leadership
• Immediate impact observed in:
  • Maternal & child health programmes
  • TB, Malaria, HIV/AIDS control
  • Disease surveillance in developing countries
• Creates leadership and funding vacuum in global governance
• Potential strategic gain for China and Russia  
• Continuation of unilateralism and protectionism (tariffs, sanctions)

Static Linkages

•   Multilateral institutions formed post-1945
• Global commons: atmosphere, climate, public health
• Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)
• Rules-based international order
• Collective action problem in global governance

Critical Analysis

• Pros (U.S. perspective):
  • Policy autonomy
  • Reduced financial obligations
  • Domestic political consolidation
• Cons (Global perspective):
  • Weakening of global climate action
  • Funding shock to Global South programmes  
  • Erosion of multilateral trust
  • Rise of norm-setting by non-democratic powers
  • Undermining climate justice and intergenerational equity

Way Forward

• Strengthening of multilateral coalitions without U.S.
• Greater leadership role for middle powers  
• Diversification of funding sources for UN agencies
• Institutional reforms to reduce donor dependence
• Ethics-based and science-driven global governance

YOUNG LOVE

Context of the News

• On January 9, the Supreme Court of India acknowledged misuse of the POCSO Act, 2012 in cases of consensual adolescent relationships.
• Court observed that families are invoking POCSO to penalise relationships disapproved socially (caste/religion/choice-based).
• Judgment forwarded to the Law Secretary to explore legal and policy measures to curb misuse.
• Aligns with concerns raised in the Law Commission of India (2023).

Key Points

• POCSO Act, 2012
  • Age of consent fixed at 18 years.
  • Based on strict liability → consent of minor is irrelevant.
  • Provides mandatory minimum sentences.
• Identified Issue
  • Consensual relationships (16–18 years) treated at par with sexual exploitation.
  • Parents file cases of kidnapping + sexual assault in elopement cases.
• Law Commission (2023)
  • Rejected lowering age of consent (risk of trafficking, child marriage).
  • Recommended “guided judicial discretion” in sentencing for 16–18 age group.
• Institutional Gap
  • Absence of non-punitive mechanisms like counselling and mediation.
  • Police-led response dominates welfare-based interventions.

Static Linkages

• Child Definition: Below 18 years (UNCRC, JJ Act, 2015).
• Strict Liability: No requirement of mens rea.
• Article 21: Right to life includes personal autonomy and dignity.
• Article 39(f): Protection of children against exploitation.
• Criminal Jurisprudence: Principle of proportionality in punishment.

Critical Analysis

• Strengths of POCSO
  • Strong legal deterrence against child sexual abuse.
  • Victim-centric procedures (child-friendly courts).
  • Compliance with international child protection norms.
• Concerns
  • Over-criminalisation of consensual adolescent behaviour.
  • Misuse as a tool of familial and social control.
  • Mandatory sentencing limits judicial discretion.
  • Blurring distinction between abuse and peer intimacy.
  • Violates spirit of substantive due process under Article 21.

Way Forward

• Introduce guided judicial discretion for consensual cases (16–18 years).
• Statutory recognition of close-in-age exception.
• Establish confidential adolescent counselling services.
•  Shift from police-first to welfare-first response.
• Capacity building of police, prosecutors, and judges.
• Periodic legislative review using court and NCRB data.